{
    "id": "gatherings-15-07",
    "type": "article-journal",
    "title": "Heidegger’s Concept of Truth: The Phenomenological Core of the Ontological Turn",
    "author": [
        {
            "family": "",
            "given": "Joshua Fahmy-Hooke"
        }
    ],
    "container-title": "Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual",
    "issued": {
        "date-parts": [
            [
                2025
            ]
        ]
    },
    "volume": "15",
    "URL": "https://staging.heidegger-circle.org/gatherings/article/15-07/",
    "ISSN": "2164-3345",
    "publisher": "Heidegger Circle",
    "language": "en",
    "page": "177-200",
    "abstract": "Despite Heidegger’s efforts to distance himself from Husserl’s\r\nphenomenology, the extent of his success in Being and Time is not im-\r\nmediately evident. Attentive readers not only recognize passages and\r\nconcepts borrowed from the Logical Investigations but also notice the\r\nconspicuous absence of Husserl’s name in connection with them. This\r\narticle demonstrates the pervasive yet hidden influence of the Logical\r\nInvestigations in §44 of Being and Time. I argue that the truncated\r\npronouncements on truth in §44 (a) and (b) find their methodologi-\r\ncal and systematic framework from Husserl’s Fifth and Sixth Logical\r\nInvestigations. At the same time, Husserl’s phenomenology is ontologi-\r\ncally limited, prompting Heidegger’s return to Aristotle and his uncon-\r\nventional reading of Metaphysics Θ."
}